Audit trail
A log only your vendor can read is not evidence
Every eSignature product has an activity log. The question that matters is whether anyone outside the product can check it, because the moment a signature is disputed, “our system says so” is not an answer.
What this looks like today
The log is a table your vendor controls
Evidence lives inside the product
Nobody can explain what it means
What Baton does about it
- 1
Every event is chained to the one before it
Each record is hashed together with its predecessor, so the history forms a chain. Alter one record and the chain breaks at that exact point, which is the difference between a history you can audit and a table somebody could have edited.
- 2
The certificate travels with the document
Who signed, when, from what address, and the SHA-256 of the exact file they saw, appended to the signed PDF itself. It keeps working after you stop being a customer.
- 3
A plain-English verdict
The trail reads as sentences (“Amara opened it”, “David signed it”) rather than as event codes.
What is true right now
Every line below describes something the product does today. Nothing on this page is a roadmap item wearing a feature’s clothes.
- Records are append-only, enforced by the database rather than by our code being careful.
- Deleting a document destroys the file and keeps a tombstone: the history and hashes survive.
- Every download is recorded before a single byte is served.
- Signing links are single-use, so an opened link is a real event with a real time on it.
The rest of the product
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